We propose the use of variable declarations in natural deduction. A variable declaration is a line in a derivation that introduces a new variable into the derivation. Semantically, it can be regarded as declaring that the variable denotes an element of the universe of discourse. Undeclared variables, in contrast, do not denote anything, and may not occur free in any formula in the derivation. Although most natural deduction systems in use today do not have variable declarations, the idea can be traced back to one of the first papers on natural deduction. We show how the use of variable declarations in natural deduction leads to a formal system that has a number of desirable features: It is simple, easy to use and understand, and corresponds closely to ordinary informal reasoning. Soundness and completeness of the system are easily proven. Furthermore, the system clarifies the role of the existential instantiation rule in natural deduction. [16] .) The formulation of the quantifier rules for natural deduction proved to be particularly difficult. Quine's quantifier rules included complicated restrictions involving an alphabetical ordering of the variables, and the quantifier rules in the first two editions of Copi's textbook were unsound. As Irving Anellis has observed:
Jaskowski's original 1934 paper-an idea that seems to have been largely ignored in subsequent work on natural deduction.
One way to motivate my approach is to examine some of the ideas in Fine's theory of arbitrary objects. In [6] , Fine shows how this theory can be used to facilitate soundness proofs for many natural deduction systems. Readers need not be familiar with the details of Fine's theory to understand the present paper; it will suffice to know that in his theory certain letters in a derivation denote objects that he calls "arbitrary objects", that arbitrary objects can take on values, and that there are dependency relationships among arbitrary objects that indicate when the values that can be assigned to one arbitrary object depend on the values assigned to others. For example, if x denotes an arbitrary object whose value can be any real number, and we set y equal to x 2 , then y also denotes an arbitrary object, but one that depends on x. It will also be convenient to say that in this situation the letter y depends on the letter x. (In some formal systems, such as Kalish's correction [12] of Copi's system [4] , such dependency relationships among the letters in a derivation are used in stating the restrictions on the quantifier rules.) In Fine's soundness proofs, one of the roles of the restrictions on the quantifier rules is to rule out certain dependencies among the arbitrary objects denoted by the letters in a derivation. Fine shows how the dependencies among the letters appearing in a derivation can be illustrated in a dependency diagram, and suggests that such a diagram can be helpful in checking that the restrictions on quantifier rules have been followed correctly in the derivation.
Fine's theory is very useful for proving soundness of many natural deduction systems, but its relevance to informal mathematical reasoning is less clear to me. Why, in all my years as a mathematician, have I never felt the need to make a dependency diagram to check the correctness of a mathematical proof? I believe it is because mathematicians generally ensure the correctness of their quantificational reasoning by methods other than the analysis of dependencies among arbitrary objects. Let me illustrate this with an example. Consider the following incorrect theorem:
Incorrect Theorem. There is a real number y such that for every real number x, y + 2x = 0.
Here is a natural attempt at proving this incorrect theorem:
Proof. Let y = −2x. Then y + 2x = 0. Since nothing has been assumed about x, we can conclude that for every real number x, y + 2x = 0. Thus, there is a real number y such that for every real number x, y + 2x = 0.
Someone who is accustomed to using a formal system like those found in most modern natural deduction textbooks might say that the mistake in this proof occurs in the third sentence. The generalization is improper because the variable y occurs free in the statement "for every real number x, y + 2x = 0" and the variable x occurs free in the definition of y, and this violates the restrictions on the universal generalization rule. In Fine's semantics for natural deduction systems, the arbitrary object denoted by y depends on that denoted by x, and that makes the inference to the general statement unsound. But I think most mathematicians would find the first sentence of this proof objectionable. The first sentence defines y in terms of x, but what is x? No object named x has been introduced into the proof, so the first sentence is at best confusing, if not wrong.
It is customary in mathematical proofs to introduce any variable on which generalization is to be performed, such as x in Example 1, with a sentence like "Let x be arbitrary". If such a sentence were to be added to Example 1, it would have to be inserted before the first sentence, so that it would precede the use of the letter x in that sentence. The result would be the following proof:
Proof. Let x be an arbitrary real number. Let y = −2x. Then y + 2x = 0. Since x was arbitrary, we can conclude that for every real number x, y + 2x = 0. Thus, there is a real number y such that for every real number x, y + 2x = 0.
The error in the proof is now in the fourth sentence, in which the generalization takes place. But I will argue that the error is not that y depends on x, but rather that y was introduced into the proof after x. The first sentence of the proof declares that x is to stand for an arbitrary real number. This declaration is retracted in the fourth sentence when the generalization is made. But once the declaration is retracted, everything that came after the declaration is suspect, and should no longer be used in the proof. In particular, the definition of y can no longer be trusted to determine a value for y, and so y should not appear free in the fourth sentence.
Before going on, we should look more closely at the claim that the declaration of x as an arbitrary object is retracted when the generalization is made. Is it really true that the declaration of x is retracted at this point? Perhaps another example will clarify this point. Consider a proof in which two sets, A and B, are shown to be equal by proving that each is a subset of the other. The proof might have the following form:
Proof. Let x be an arbitrary element of A. . . . Therefore, x ∈ B. Since x was an arbitrary element of A, it follows that every element of A is an element of B; i.e., A ⊆ B.
Now let x be an arbitrary element of B. . . . Therefore, x ∈ A. Since x was an arbitrary element of B, it follows that B ⊆ A.
The correctness of this proof outline suggests that the declaration of x as an arbitrary element of A must have been retracted when the generalization occurred at the end of the first paragraph. Otherwise, x would not have been available to be used to stand for an arbitrary element of B. Certainly, if the generalization had not taken place at the end of the first paragraph, then the first sentence of the second paragraph would have been incorrect. A mathematician would insist that, if x is still in use to stand for an arbitrary element of A, then a different letter must be used in the second paragraph to denote an arbitrary element of B. The fact that the use of x in the second paragraph is acceptable suggests, then, that the declaration of x as an arbitrary element of A has been retracted. 1 Let us return now to the analysis of the proof in Example 2. I have suggested that the error in this example is that y was introduced after x, and therefore cannot be used once the declaration of x is retracted. But the error can also be explained by pointing out the dependence of y on x. Why do I believe that my explanation is preferable? To begin to answer this question, let us consider what happens if we make the proof a little more complicated:
Proof. Let x be an arbitrary real number. Let z = 2x, and let y = −z. Then y + 2x = y + z = 0, etc. Now y is defined in terms of z, not x. Of course, z is defined in terms of x, so there is still an indirect dependence of y on x. But if such indirect dependencies were to be used in judging the correctness of generalizations, then in checking the correctness of a complicated proof a mathematician would have to engage in a detailed analysis of the indirect dependencies among the objects discussed in the proof. This is precisely the kind of analysis that I have argued that mathematicians do not engage in. My claim is that mathematicians avoid the need for such analyses by considering any variable that was introduced after x to be suspect, once the declaration of x as arbitrary is retracted in the generalization step.
Here is another example that may illustrate this claim more convincingly. Consider the following theorem and proof:
Theorem. For every real number x, there is a real number y such that for every real number z,
Proof. Let x and z be arbitrary real numbers. Let y = 2x. Then
as required.
Is this proof correct? I think most mathematicians would say that it is not. If a student handed in this proof on a homework assignment, I would certainly mark it as incorrect. The problem is that the definition of y comes after both x and z have been declared to be arbitrary real numbers, but in the theorem to be proven, y must not depend on z. Of course, a careful analysis of the definition of y reveals that it does not actually depend on z, but such an analysis should not be necessary in a correctly written proof. It is the responsibility of the author of the proof to show that y does not depend on z, and in the proof in Example 5 the author has not fulfilled this responsibility. The proper way to show that y does not depend on z is to introduce y into the proof before z. Thus, the beginning of the proof should have been written as follows: "Let x be an arbitrary real number. Let y = 2x. Now let z be an arbitrary real number".
Another way to state my point would be to say that it is not dependency that is important in mathematical proofs, but rather potential dependency. If we declare that x stands for something arbitrary, and then introduce another variable y while that declaration is in force, then y has the potential to depend on x, although a careful analysis of the definition of y may show that it does not actually depend on x. On the other hand, if the introduction of y comes before the declaration of x as arbitrary, then y does not have the potential to depend on x. If the soundness of some later inference requires that y not depend on x, then we must institute rules to make sure that such a dependency does not occur. The simplest rule -the one that I believe mathematicians usually use -is to insist that y not even have the potential to depend on x. And this can be accomplished by making sure that y was not introduced while the declaration of x as arbitrary was in force. This is completely analogous to the way mathematicians treat assumptions in proofs. If an assumption is introduced in a proof, and then, while this assumption is in force, an assertion is made, then the assertion has the potential to depend on the assumption. In this situation, most mathematicians would consider it to be incorrect to continue to use the assertion once the assumption has been discharged, even if a careful analysis of the justification for the assertion shows that it does not actually depend on the assumption. The assertion has the potential to depend on the assumption, and therefore cannot be trusted once the assumption is no longer in force. For example, consider the following theorem and proof:
Theorem. For every real number x, x 2 + 1 ≥ 2x, and if x ≥ 2 then x 2 ≥ 2x. Proof. Let x be an arbitrary real number, and suppose that x ≥ 2. Since
And multiplying both sides of the inequality x ≥ 2 by x, which must be positive, we can conclude that x 2 ≥ 2x. Since x was arbitrary, this shows that for every real number x, x 2 + 1 ≥ 2x, and if x ≥ 2 then x 2 ≥ 2x.
I would regard this proof as incorrect, because the proof of x 2 + 1 ≥ 2x is given while the assumption x ≥ 2 is in force, but the theorem asserts x 2 + 1 ≥ 2x unconditionally. A careful analysis of the reasoning in the proof shows that the assumption x ≥ 2 was not actually used in the proof that x 2 + 1 ≥ 2x, but this does not make the proof correct. A correct proof must demonstrate that x 2 + 1 ≥ 2x holds unconditionally by proving it in a context in which no assumptions are in force, and this proof does not do that.
This feature of the treatment of assumptions in mathematical proofs is accurately modeled by Fitch-style natural deduction systems in which assumptions introduce subordinate derivations. In such systems, it is incorrect to use a statement that appears in a subordinate derivation outside of that subordinate derivation. The statements in the subordinate derivation may or may not actually depend on the assumption that introduced the subordinate derivation; they are banned outside the subordinate derivation because they have the potential to depend on that assumption. For this reason, I regard Fitch-style systems as capturing the way in which assumptions are used in informal mathematical reasoning more accurately than non-Fitch-style systems.
One could imagine creating a system with subordinate derivations in which, when a subordinate derivation ends with the discharging of an assumption, one must engage in an analysis of all of the lines in the subordinate derivation to see which ones depend on the assumption being discharged and which ones do not. Those that depend on the assumption would become unavailable for further use outside of the subordinate derivation, but those that do not would remain available. Such a system would not be wrong, but I think most people regard the usual rule -that all statements inside the subordinate derivation are unavailable outside of the subordinate derivation -as more natural. If a statement does not depend on the assumption that introduces the subordinate derivation, and if that fact is important in the derivation, then that statement does not belong inside the subordinate derivation. I would argue that analogous reasoning applies to the introduction of a variable, say x, to stand for an arbitrary object in a mathematical proof: if it is important that a second variable y not depend on x, then the introduction of y does not belong inside the part of the proof in which the declaration of x as arbitrary is in force.
Perhaps some readers believe that the proofs in Examples 5 and 6, while poorly written, are not really wrong. Such readers might find the following incorrect theorem and proof instructive: Proof. Let a and b be arbitrary elements of A and B, respectively. Then
Therefore a ∈ C and b ∈ D. Since a ∈ C and a was an arbitrary element of A, we can conclude that A ⊆ C. And since b ∈ D and b was an arbitrary element of B, it follows that B ⊆ D.
This proof seems quite plausible, and in fact some readers may be convinced by this proof that the theorem is actually correct. The following counterexample should settle the matter: Let A = ∅, B = R, and C = D = Z. Then A × B = ∅ and C × D is the set of all pairs of integers, so A × B ⊆ C × D. But B D, contrary to the statement of the theorem.
Where did the proof go wrong? The problem is that the proof that A ⊆ C improperly makes use of the arbitrary element b of B, and the proof that B ⊆ D improperly makes use of the arbitrary element a of A. The author of the proof has tried to take a shortcut by proving A ⊆ C and B ⊆ D simultaneously. If we eliminate the shortcut and structure the proof properly, then we must prove that A ⊆ C by letting a be an arbitrary element of A and proving that a ∈ C, and then we must prove that B ⊆ D by letting b be an arbitrary element of B and proving that b ∈ D. In neither part of the proof can the arbitrary object from the other part be used.
This proof illustrates that the dependencies among assertions, assumptions, and introductions of variables can be quite subtle, and catching errors resulting from improper dependencies can be difficult. The safest policy is the one that I believe mathematicians generally follow: once an assumption or a declaration that a variable stands for an arbitrary object is retracted, nothing that has appeared in the proof since the assumption or declaration can be used.
If what I have argued above is correct, then sentences of the form "Let x be arbitrary" are included in proofs not merely as a courtesy to the reader, to help him see where the proof is heading, but rather as part of an important mechanism for regulating potential dependencies among variables. And the mechanism does not require that we keep track of actual dependencies among variables; we need only pay attention to the order in which variables are introduced and introductions of variables are retracted. I want to see now what happens if we include such a mechanism in a formal natural deduction system. In keeping with the discussion above, the system I will propose will be a Fitchstyle system with subordinate derivations. Subordinate derivations will be used, not only to keep track of which lines of the derivation have the potential to depend on previous assumptions, but also to keep track of which lines have the potential to depend on previous declarations of variables as arbitrary.
I begin by taking seriously the idea that the first sentence of the proof in Example 1 is unacceptable because it contains a free occurrence of the variable x, but x has not yet been introduced into the proof. The heart of my proposal is that a variable must not occur free in any line of a derivation unless the variable has first been properly introduced into the derivation. This idea is similar to an idea that is common in computer programming. In many programming languages, it is an error to use an expression as a variable without first telling the computer, in a line called a variable declaration, that you intend to use that expression as a variable. My formal system will also include variable declarations, and it will have a similar rule that a variable may not occur free in a formula unless it has been declared. 2 Note that the rule will apply only to free variables; bound variables will not need to be declared.
Variable declarations will play a role in my formal system that is similar to the role played by assumptions. Usually, some assumptions are made at the beginning of a derivation (namely, the premises of the derivation), but sometimes additional assumptions are introduced in the course of the derivation. For example, in a conditional proof one introduces a temporary assumption ϕ, infers some formula ψ, and then, by the rule of conditional introduction, discharges the assumption and infers the conditional ϕ → ψ. The semantic interpretation of assumptions is clear: they are formulas that are presumed to be true. The premises are presumed to be true throughout the derivation, but a temporary assumption introduced in the course of the derivation is presumed to be true only from the line at which it is introduced to the line at which it is discharged. Since my system will be a Fitch-style system, the part of the derivation in which such a temporary assumption is in force -the scope of the assumption -will be set off from the rest of the derivation as a subordinate derivation. Assumptions in formal derivations correspond to sentences in informal mathematical proofs that begin with the word "assume" or "suppose".
Variable declarations will also be allowed both at the beginning of a derivation and during the course of the derivation. The semantic interpretation of a declaration of a variable is that it tells us that the variable is to be thought of as standing for some element of the universe of discourse. 3 Undeclared variables, in contrast, do not stand for anything. The rule that undeclared variables may not occur free in a formula is therefore semantically motivated, because a formula containing a free variable has no truth value if that variable does not stand for something. Variable declarations that occur at the beginning of a derivation will specify variables that stand for something throughout the derivation, and are like global variable declarations in computer programs. Variable declarations that occur in the course of the derivation will specify variables that stand for something in only some part of the derivation, and are therefore like local variable declarations in computer programs.
Variable declarations correspond to sentences in informal mathematical proofs that begin with the word "let". However, it is important to recognize two slightly different uses of the word "let" in informal mathematical proofs. The first occurs when one begins a proof of a statement of the form ∀xϕ(x) with the sentence "Let v be arbitrary". This sentence says that the variable v, which did not previously stand for anything, is now to stand for something (although of course exactly what it stands for is deliberately left unspecified), so it is appropriate to think of it as a variable declaration. This declaration is both temporary and hypothetical. It is temporary because we treat v as standing for something only until we are able to deduce ϕ(v); once we have deduced ϕ(v) we retract the declaration of v and infer ∀xϕ(x). 4 It is hypothetical because the purpose of the reasoning that takes place while the declaration of v is in force is to see what would be true if v stood for something; no attempt is made to actually assign a value to v, or even to show that such an assignment is possible. 5 Of course, there is an obvious parallel between this kind of variable declaration and the assumption that introduces a conditional proof, which is also temporary and hypothetical. These variable declarations will be represented in my formal system by lines of the form "Declare v". Such a line will be used to begin a subordinate derivation, with the subordinate derivation ending when the declaration of v is retracted. Thus, the scope of this kind of variable declaration will be the subordinate derivation that it introduces.
A slightly different use of the word "let" occurs when one uses a statement of the form ∃xϕ(x) to justify the sentence "Let v be something such that ϕ(v) is true". The purpose of this sentence is not merely to allow us to discover what would be true if v stood for an object such that ϕ(v) is true; no justification would be needed if that were the purpose of the sentence. Rather, the purpose is to introduce the variable v into the proof as standing for something such that we can say with confidence that ϕ(v) is true, and it is correct to do this only if we know that such a v exists. Thus, this declaration is nonhypothetical. Furthermore, this kind of declaration typically does not get retracted, so it is permanent. Declarations of this kind will be represented in my formal system by lines of the form "Declare v: ϕ(v)". Such a line will not begin a new subordinate derivation. It will serve the purpose of both declaring the variable v and introducing the assumption 6 ϕ(v), with the declaration of v and the assumption ϕ(v) both remaining in force until the end of the innermost subordinate derivation in which the line occurs; if the line does not occur in a subordinate derivation, then the declaration and assumption remain in force until the end of the derivation. In other words, the scopes of both the declaration and the assumption will extend from the line in question to the end of the derivation or innermost subordinate derivation in which it occurs.
Global variable declarations can be thought of as corresponding to uses of the word "let" in the statement of a theorem, rather than in its proof. Sometimes such declarations are implicit; for example, instead of beginning the statement of a theorem with the sentence "Let x be a real number and suppose x > 0", a mathematician might simply write "Suppose x > 0", if the context makes it clear that x stands for a real number. However, in formal derivations 3 The precise significance of this statement will be made clear later, when I sketch a proof of soundness for my system. 4 Here, ϕ(v) denotes the result of substituting the variable v for all free occurrences of x in ϕ(x). Such a substitution can have unintended consequences if v also occurs as a quantified variable in ϕ(x), but methods for dealing with this problem are well known. Here, and throughout this paper, I assume that such substitutability problems are dealt with by one of the standard methods.
5 Below, I discuss the possibility of allowing the universe of discourse to be empty. If the universe of discourse were empty then an assignment of a value to v would not even be possible.
6 It may seem strange to call ϕ(v) an assumption, since a justification for it has been given. However, it plays the role of an assumption in the derivation because it is an assertion that is not logically implied by previous lines of the derivation. We will have more to say about this later, when we discuss the proof of the soundness theorem.
we will require that all global variable declarations be explicit. We also require that only globally declared variables may appear free in either the premises or the conclusion of a derivation.
We will say that a variable v is a declared variable at a line of a derivation if that line falls within the scope of a declaration of v. Variable declarations will be governed by the following natural rules:
1. A variable may not occur free in a line of a derivation if it is not a declared variable at that line. 2. A declaration of a variable may not occur in a line of a derivation if the line is in the scope of a previous declaration of the same variable. 7 In addition, there is a rule about subordinate derivations that applies to subordinate derivations introduced by both variable declarations and assumptions:
3. Every subordinate derivation must end before the end of the derivation. If a subordinate derivation begins and then, before the subordinate derivation ends, another subordinate derivation begins, then the second subordinate derivation must end before the first. In other words, subordinate derivations must be nested.
This rule is already included in many natural deduction systems. Sometimes it is explicit (as in Klenk [14] ), but often it is implicit in the way indentation is used to mark subordinate derivations. Note that programming languages usually have a similar rule about the way structures like loops can be combined in computer programs; in fact, the nesting of these structures in programs is also often marked by indentation. As usual, a line in a derivation can be used to justify a later line, including a line inside a subordinate derivation, but a line in a subordinate derivation cannot be used once the subordinate derivation has ended.
With this framework in place, we can now describe the rules for the introduction and elimination of quantifiers. What is interesting about these rules is that they do not require any complicated, unmotivated restrictions on the use of variables.
Universal Generalization (UG): If you begin a subordinate derivation with the line "Declare v", and then you deduce ϕ(v) in this subordinate derivation, then you may end the subordinate derivation and infer ∀xϕ(x). Universal Instantiation (UI): If t is a term and all variables occurring in t are declared variables, then from ∀xϕ(x) you may infer ϕ(t). 8 Existential Generalization (EG): If t is a term and all variables occurring in t are declared variables, then from ϕ(t) you may infer ∃xϕ(x). Existential Instantiation (EI): You may use the line ∃xϕ(x) to justify the line "Declare v: ϕ(v)". This line both declares the variable v and also asserts the statement ϕ(v).
Of course, the declaration of the variable v in the universal generalization rule is intended to correspond to the sentence "Let v be arbitrary" that is used in informal proofs. The arbitrariness of v is ensured by rules 1 and 2, which say that v must not have been declared already, and therefore nothing could have been assumed about it. Similarly, these rules guarantee that in the existential instantiation rule, nothing is assumed to be true about v other than ϕ(v).
It may be instructive to look at a few examples of correct and incorrect derivations in this system, to see how the rules we have stated allow sound reasoning but prohibit unsound reasoning. In these derivations we follow the convention, used in many logic textbooks, of setting off subordinate derivations by indenting them. The declarations and assumptions that introduce a derivation or subordinate derivation are separated from the rest of the derivation by a horizontal line. Vertical lines mark the extents of derivations.
We begin with the sound inference from ∃y∀x P x y to ∀x∃y P x y. The derivation below illustrates all four of the quantifier rules.
Example 8.
1
∃y∀x
Of course, the reverse inference, from ∀x∃y P x y to ∃y∀x P x y, is not sound. Here is a natural attempt at justifying this inference:
5* ∀x P xv UG, 2-4
The incorrect line in this derivation, marked by an asterisk, is line 5. The variable v occurs free in this line, but it is not in the scope of the declaration in line 4. Thus, this is a violation of our rule 1.
Here is an attempt at inferring ∃x(P x ∧ Qx) from ∃x P x and ∃x Qx:
Example 10.
The incorrect step this time is line 4. This step violates rule 2, because the variable v was already declared in line 3.
As encouraging as it is to see these typical inference errors blocked by our rules, the only way to be sure that all errors are blocked is to give a soundness proof. Although I will not give a complete soundness proof, it is not hard to sketch how such a proof would proceed. It will be helpful first to introduce some terminology.
If D is a set of variables, and A is a set of formulas such that every variable that occurs free in a formula in A is an element of D, then we will say that the pair (D, A) is a context. There are a few contexts that will be important in our discussion of the soundness theorem. If D is the set of globally declared variables in a derivation, and A is the set of premises of the derivation, then since only globally declared variables may appear free in a premise, (D, A) is a context. We will call it the global context of the derivation. If D is the set of declared variables at line n of a derivation, and A is the set of assumptions in force at that line (including any variable declarations or assumptions that are introduced in line n), then it is an easy consequence of rules 1 and 3 that every variable that occurs free in a formula in A is an element of D, so (D, A) is a context. We will call it the context of line n of the derivation. Now suppose line n occurs in a subordinate derivation, and let line m be the first line of the innermost subordinate derivation in which line n occurs. We will refer to the context of line m as the parent context of line n. If line n is not in any subordinate derivations then we define the parent context of line n to be the global context of the derivation. The only difference between the context and the parent context of line n is that the context of line n may include some extra declared variables and assumptions that were introduced as a result of applications of EI. For example, in Example 8 the context of line 6 is ({v}, {∃y∀x P x y, ∀x P xv}); it does not include u as a declared variable because the scope of the declaration of u ends at line 5. The parent context of line 6 is the global context of the derivation, which is (∅, {∃y∀x P x y}). The context of line 6 differs from its parent context because of the use of EI in line 2.
We will use the usual terminology that a structure A for a first-order language consists of a universe |A| together with an appropriate assignment of meanings to the nonlogical symbols of the language. If A is a structure, ϕ is a formula, and s is a function assigning values in |A| to a set of variables that includes all free variables in ϕ, then we will write A | ϕ[s] to mean that ϕ is true in the structure A, when the free variables are taken as standing for the elements of the universe specified by s. This is defined by the usual recursive definition. We will say that a pair (A, s) is a model of a context (D, A) if A is a structure for the language, s : D → |A|, and for every ϕ ∈ A, A | ϕ[s]. We will sometimes express the fact that A | ϕ[s] by saying that ϕ is true in the model (A, s).
For example, suppose (A, s) is a model of the context of line n of a derivation. Then every assumption in force at line n of the derivation is true in the model (A, s); this formalizes our earlier informal statement that assumptions are statements that are presumed to be true. And the function s assigns values in the universe of discourse to the variables that are declared at line n, but not to other variables; this formalizes our earlier informal statement that declared variables stand for elements of the universe of discourse, but undeclared variables do not stand for anything.
With this terminology in place, we can now sketch the proof of the soundness theorem. We first give a precise statement of the theorem.
Soundness Theorem. The conclusion of a derivation is true in every model of the global context of the derivation.
To prove the theorem we will need to establish two principles that hold in all derivations. The first is that every formula that appears in a derivation is true in every model of the context of the line in which it appears. We will refer to this principle as the context validity principle. The second is that if (A, s) is a model of the parent context of a line of a derivation, then there is a function s extending s such that (A, s ) is a model of the context of that line. We will call this the parent context extension principle. To see why these principles imply the soundness theorem, suppose (A, s) is a model of the global context of a derivation. This context is the parent context of the last line of the derivation, so by the parent context extension principle for that line, there is a function s extending s such that (A, s ) is a model of the context of the last line of the derivation. It now follows, by the context validity principle for the last line, that the conclusion of the derivation is true in the model (A, s ). But we have insisted that all variables that occur free in the conclusion of the derivation must be globally declared variables, which are all in the domain of s. Therefore the conclusion is also true in the model (A, s), as required.
We prove both the context validity principle and the parent context extension principle simultaneously, by induction. Thus, we may assume that both principles hold for all lines in some derivation up to line n, and we must prove that both principles hold at line n. In a complete proof we would now have to consider all of the possibilities for what inference rule was used in line n. We will not check all of these cases, but it may elucidate the semantic role of variable declarations if we consider the cases for the four quantifier rules.
We begin with the rule UI. Suppose line n of the derivation is ϕ(t), and it is inferred by UI from a previous line, say line m, of the form ∀xϕ(x). Since application of UI does not introduce any new declared variables or assumptions, the context of line n is the same as the context of line n − 1, so the parent context extension principle for line n follows immediately from the principle for line n −1. However, the context validity principle will require more work. To prove it, let (A, s) be a model of the context of line n. It is not hard to see that every variable declaration or assumption that was in force at line m in still in force at line n; if not, then line m must be inside some subordinate derivation that ended before line n, in which case it would not be legal to use line m to justify line n. Therefore (A, s ) is a model of the context of line m, where s is the restriction of s to the set of declared variables at line m. It follows, by the context validity principle for line m, that A | ∀xϕ(x) [s] . Since all variables occurring in t are declared, and therefore in the domain of s, t denotes some element of |A| when the variables are given the values specified by s. Therefore A | ϕ(t)[s], as required. The proof for the rule EG is similar. Now suppose line n is the formula ∀xϕ(x), justified in accordance with the rule UG by a subordinate derivation in which a new variable v is declared and then ϕ(v) is derived. Once again, the proof of the parent context extension principle is trivial, and we begin the proof of the context validity principle by assuming that (A, s) is a model of the context of line n. Let s be any function that extends s by assigning a value to the previously undeclared variable v. Then (A, s ) is a model of the context of the first line of the subordinate derivation. This context is also the parent context of line n − 1, on which the formula ϕ(v) appears. Thus, by the parent context extension principle for line n − 1, there is a function s extending s such that (A, s ) is a model of the context of line n − 1, and by the context validity principle for that line, A | ϕ(v) [s ] . According to rule 1 for variable declarations, any variable that occurs free in ∀xϕ(x) must be a declared variable at line n, and is therefore in the domain of s. Therefore every variable that occurs free in ϕ(v) is in the domain of s , so A | ϕ(v) [s ] . Since the value assigned to v by s was arbitrary, we can conclude that A | ∀xϕ(x) [s] .
Finally, suppose line n is the nonhypothetical declaration "Declare v: ϕ(v)", justified in accordance with the rule EI by appeal to a formula of the form ∃xϕ(x) on some previous line m. Since line n both declares the variable v and also introduces the assumption ϕ(v), the context of line n is (D ∪ {v}, A ∪ {ϕ(v)}), where (D, A) is the context of line n − 1. This time the proof of the context validity principle is trivial, since ϕ(v) is an assumption in the context of line n, and it is the proof of the parent context extension principle that requires some work. Suppose that (A, s) is a model of the parent context of line n. This is also the parent context of line n − 1, so by the parent context extension principle for line n − 1, there is a function s extending s such that (A, s ) is a model of the context (D, A). We must extend s further to assign a value to the newly declared variable v in such a way that ϕ(v) will be true in the resulting model. But by the context validity principle for line m, we know that A | ∃xϕ(x)[s ], so this can be done.
This proof may help to explain how my formal system resolves a troubling dilemma concerning the rule EI. It is tempting to think of EI as justifying an inference from ∃xϕ(x) to ϕ(v), but this cannot be right, because ϕ(v) is not logically implied by ∃xϕ(x). In many formal systems the formula ϕ(v) is treated as an assumption rather than an inference, but this fails to capture the intuition that the formula ∃xϕ(x) provides some sort of justification for the formula ϕ(v). The view of the rule EI that is suggested by my formal system is that what is justified by ∃xϕ(x) is not the asserting of ϕ(v), but rather the declaring of v as something such that ϕ(v) is true. The sense in which this declaration is justified is clarified by the role of the parent context extension principle in the proof of the soundness theorem. To say that an inference step is correct means that the statement being inferred is true whenever the statements used to justify the inference are true, and in the proof of the soundness theorem this is used to establish the fact that the truth of the context validity principle is preserved from one step to the next. Similarly, to say that a nonhypothetical variable declaration is correct means that it is possible to assign an appropriate value to the variable being declared whenever the existential statement used to justify the declaration is true, and in the proof of the soundness theorem this is used to establish the fact that the truth of the parent context extension principle is preserved from one step to the next. Thus, in my formal system the dilemma regarding the status of the rule EI is resolved by saying that it is neither a rule for justifying inferences nor a rule for introducing assumptions, but rather a rule for justifying nonhypothetical variable declarations. 9 The proof of the soundness theorem also helps to explain the use of certain imperative sentences in informal mathematical proofs. Many imperative sentences in informal proofs begin with one of the words "assume", "suppose", or "let". These sentences ask the reader to do something, but what, exactly, is he being asked to do? The answer suggested by the proof of the soundness theorem is that he is being asked to make a change of context. These sentences correspond precisely to those points in a formal derivation at which the context is enlarged. 10 The proof of soundness given above is similar in some ways to the proofs of soundness given by Fine in [6] . It is most closely related to the proof sketched on p. 203 of [6] , which makes no use of arbitrary objects, but even the proofs that use a generic semantics, in which letters denote arbitrary objects, have some features in common with my soundness proof. For example, my parent context extension principle is reminiscent of Fine's condition of extendibility of A-models, and my context validity principle is similar to Fine's condition of line soundness. My distinction between declared and undeclared variables is also similar to a distinction Fine makes between "occupied" 9 Fine expresses a similar point of view on pp. 129-130 of [6] , when discussing the following fragment of informal reasoning: "There exists a bisector to the angle α. Call it B". According to Fine, "The statement that B is a bisector to the angle is not assumed and nor is it inferred. Rather, the premiss that there is a bisector to the angle justifies us in introducing the term 'B' for the arbitrary bisector into the reasoning". For another approach to EI, see Silver [18] . 10 Jeffrey King makes a similar point in [13] , where he describes EI as a "context changing rule" (p. 245).
and "vacant" arbitrary objects. However, it seems to me that in many ways my approach is simpler than the generic approach. For example, if we were to use a generic approach, then we would have to say that free variables denote arbitrary objects, and these arbitrary objects take their values in the universe of discourse of some structure. But in my approach, the free variables directly denote the objects in the universe of discourse of the structure. Furthermore, in assigning arbitrary objects as values of free variables, we would have to determine what the dependency relationships between these objects should be. In my proof, all discussion of dependency relationships disappears. The dependencies among variables essentially take care of themselves, once we institute the requirement that a variable may not occur free unless it has been declared.
Fine considers a number of approaches that might be used in analyzing the semantics of quantificational reasoning. My approach is an example of what he calls an "ambiguous names" approach (see p. 139 of [6] ). Fine suggests that in an ambiguous names approach, some care will be needed to make sure that the values assigned to variables are correlated with each other, as required by the dependencies among the variables: "It might even be assumed that the ambiguous names are given some structure from which the systematic correlation can be determined" (p. 140). 11 But as my soundness proof shows, the use of variable declarations makes such measures unnecessary. Fine also argues that the ambiguous names approach violates a "lingering intuition that, in instantial reasoning, we are reasoning about a distinctive object" (p. 141). I have little to say about this, other than that my intuitions are different from Fine's; the ambiguous names approach is in complete agreement with my intuitions about instantial reasoning.
Nevertheless, those who prefer to think of free variables as standing for arbitrary objects can easily rewrite my soundness proof to respect that preference. The most significant change in the proof will be that when arbitrary objects are assigned as the values of declared variables, their dependency relationships will need to be determined. If a declaration of a variable v occurs in line n of the derivation, then within the scope of that declaration, v will denote an arbitrary object that depends on some subset of the collection of arbitrary objects denoted by the other variables that are declared variables at line n. An alternative approach would be to make the arbitrary object denoted by v depend on all of the objects in this collection. The resulting proof will be similar to the proof on p. 180 of [6] .
There are some logic textbooks whose formal systems treat letters in a way that is similar to the one I am proposing. Perhaps the closest is Klenk [14] , although Barwise and Etchemendy [2] is also similar. Where I have used variable declarations, Klenk uses flagged constants, and Barwise and Etchemendy use boxed constants. Barwise and Etchemendy say that boxing a constant c in preparation for a use of their universal introduction rule is "the formal analog of the English phrase 'Let c denote an arbitrary object' ", which is similar to my motivation for declaring variables in preparation for a use of universal generalization. However, their existential elimination rule is different from my existential instantiation rule. Klenk's quantificational rules are all similar to mine, but her stated motivation for flagging constants is different. According to Klenk, "To flag a letter is just something like noting that it requires special attention" (p. 265), where this "special attention" consists of restrictions designed to prevent certain errors of reasoning. For example, the incorrect derivation in Example 9 can be translated into Klenk's system by simply replacing my variable declarations by flaggings of constants. She would then say that it is wrong to infer ∀x P xv in line 5 because her system includes a restriction that a flagged constant must not occur outside of the subordinate derivation in which it is introduced. But I would add the semantic motivation that it is in fact meaningless to assert ∀x P xv in line 5, because v is undeclared in the context in which line 5 occurs and therefore does not stand for anything.
It might be thought that Barwise, Etchemendy, and Klenk's motivations are not that different from mine, but there is another formal difference between my system and theirs that suggests that they did not have the same motivation, or at least that they did not follow it to its logical conclusion. In the system I have described it is illegal to use universal instantiation to infer ϕ(v) from ∀xϕ(x) unless v has been declared. However, their systems (and, in fact, most 12 natural deduction systems) have no such restriction on the letters used in universal instantiation. The flagging and boxing of constants in their systems play roles in universal generalization and existential instantiation that are similar to the role played by variable declarations in my system, but my variable declarations play another, more fundamental role. In my system, a letter cannot be treated as standing for something until it has been declared. There is no such restriction on the use of letters in their systems.
This difference has an important consequence. The following derivation is illegal in my system, but legal in most natural deduction systems, including the systems of Barwise and Etchemendy and Klenk:
Example 11.
In fact, it is impossible to derive ∃x P x from ∀x P x in my system. To see why, simply note that the proof of the soundness theorem for my system still goes through if we allow our structures to have empty universes. 13 But in a structure with empty universe, ∀x P x is true and ∃x P x is false, so the soundness theorem guarantees that there can be no derivation of ∃x P x from ∀x P x. Of course, if we add a global declaration of the variable v to the derivation in Example 11, then it would become correct in my system. This does not contradict the soundness theorem, because any model of a context in which there is a declared variable must have a nonempty universe.
Is this a point in favor of my system or a point against it? I believe that there are reasons for regarding this as a point in favor of my system. First, I think it is intuitively natural to regard it as incorrect to infer ∃x P x from ∀x P x. If this inference is allowed, then from the logical truth that everything is self-identical we will be able to infer ∃x(x = x). But why should the existence of anything be a logical truth? I suspect that most formal deduction systems allow the inference from ∀x P x to ∃x P x not because it is regarded as intuitively correct, but because of a belief that any formal system whose semantics allows for the possibility of empty universes would have to be awkward. My proposal shows that this belief is incorrect. 14 More importantly, I believe that there are good pedagogical reasons for disallowing inferences like the one in Example 11. Mathematicians generally do not write sentences containing free undeclared variables, like the first sentence of the proof in Example 1, because the meanings of such sentences are not clear. Undergraduates who are just learning to write mathematical proofs sometimes do use free variables without declaring them, and in my experience it is almost always a sign that they are confused. Disallowing such reasoning would help students learn to reason correctly.
We have seen that some logic textbooks use natural deduction systems that are similar in some respects to my system, but that there are nevertheless important differences between those systems and mine. It is remarkable that among the previously proposed systems of quantifier rules for natural deduction, the one that is perhaps closest to mine can be found in Jaskowski's original 1934 paper [11] . Jaskowski does not include an existential quantifier in his system, but he proposes two different sets of rules for universal quantifiers. The first rules are for universal quantification over propositions, and they are similar to the rules found in many modern systems. For example, his universal generalization rule says that from ϕ( p) one may infer ∀ pϕ( p), as long as p does not occur free in any supposition on which ϕ( p) depends. In the final section of his paper, Jaskowski considers using the same rules for universal quantification over individuals, but he rejects this idea because such rules would not be sound for 13 Thus, my system is an example of what Fine calls an "inclusive" system; see Chapter 21 of [6] . Rephrasing my rules in Fine's terminology, I would say that a line in a derivation is legitimate if every variable occurring free in that line is sanctioned by a declaration of that variable, and in the case of a nonhypothetical declaration, the presuppositional backing of the declaration is provided by the existential statement to which EI is applied. Hypothetical declarations, in contrast, require no presuppositional backing. I therefore disagree with Fine's suggestion on p. 206 that in an inclusive system all letters require presuppositional backing. For another way to formulate an inclusive natural deduction system, see the description of E-logic in [20, pp. 50-52] or [21, pp. 100-102] .
The inclusiveness of the system explains the reason for the restriction in UI and EG that all variables occurring in t must be declared variables. In almost all cases, this restriction will be enforced automatically by the rule that variables may not occur free unless they are declared. The exceptions involve cases of vacuous quantification. For example, the inference from ∀x∃y P y to ∃y P y cannot be made unless there is a term t all of whose variables are declared. This restriction is necessary, since the inference is unsound unless we know that the universe is nonempty. 14 For example, Bostock [3] argues (pp. 348-351) that if empty universes are allowed, then either we must also allow the use of empty names (i.e., names that fail to denote anything), or else the cut principle and modus ponens will fail. My system shows that one can allow empty universes without accepting either of these consequences.
Although I regard it as an advantage that my system allows for structures with empty universe, this is not a central feature of the system. Readers who disagree with me and prefer to disallow structures with empty universe can do so by making only small changes in the system. For example, one could allow nonhypothetical variable declarations to occur anywhere in a derivation, with no justification required. Such lines would correspond to sentences in an informal proof of the form "Let v be anything at all", and could be thought of as uses of an implicit assumption that the universe is nonempty. structures with empty universe. He therefore proposes new rules that are sound for empty universes, and these rules are essentially the same as the rules I have proposed. Where I write "Declare v" to begin a subordinate derivation leading to an application of universal generalization, Jaskowski writes "T v". Here he requires that v must be a previously undeclared variable, just as in my rule 2 for variable declarations. And he then modifies some of his earlier rules to ensure that undeclared variables will not occur free in any formula, thereby enforcing my rule 1. The biggest difference between Jaskowski's rules and mine is that Jaskowski has no rules for existential quantifiers. Thus, my system might be regarded as an extension of Jaskowski's to include rules for existential quantifiers.
Since my system disallows certain inferences allowed in other systems, such as the objectionable inference from ∀x P x to ∃x P x, the reader might be worried that it will disallow some unobjectionable inferences. To allay these fears, we need a completeness theorem. To discuss the theorem, the following terminology will be helpful. We will say that a formula ϕ is derivable in a context (D, A) if there is a derivation of ϕ such that all of the globally declared variables in the derivation are in D and all of the premises of the derivation are in A. Note that, since derivations are finite, the sets of globally declared variables and premises in a derivation are always finite, but the sets D and A could be infinite. Here is a sketch of a proof of the completeness theorem, modeled on the familiar proof due to Henkin (see Enderton [5] ). By renaming some free variables if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that there are infinitely many variables that are not in the set D. Suppose that ϕ is not derivable in the context (D, A). Then it is impossible to derive a contradiction in the context (D, A ∪ {¬ϕ}); i.e., this context is consistent. Extend this context to a consistent context (D , A ) such that for every formula ψ all of whose free variables are elements of D , either ψ or ¬ψ is an element of A , and also for every formula of the form ∃xψ(x) that is an element of A , there is some variable v ∈ D such that ψ(v) ∈ A . The assumption that there are infinitely many variables that are not in D guarantees that there will be an adequate supply of variables to use in meeting this last requirement.
For readers who are interested, we supply more details of how this construction is carried out. Let ψ 0 , ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . be an enumeration of all formulas in the language in which each formula appears infinitely many times. We now define a sequence of consistent contexts (D 0 , A 0 ), (D 1 , A 1 ), (D 2 , A 2 ) , . . . recursively as follows: Let (D 0 , A 0 ) = (D, A ∪ {¬ϕ}). Given (D n , A n ), if all variables occurring free in ψ n are elements of D n , but neither ψ n nor ¬ψ n is an element of A n , then we let (D n+1 , A n+1 ) be either (D n , A n ∪ {ψ n }) or (D n , A n ∪ {¬ψ n }); it is easy to verify that at least one of these is consistent. If ψ n ∈ D n and ψ n has the form ∃xψ(x), then we choose a variable v that is not an element of D n and we let (D n+1 , A n+1 ) = (D n ∪ {v}, A n ∪ {ψ(v)}). If there is a derivation of a contradiction in this context, then we can derive a contradiction in the context (D n , A n ) by applying the EI rule to the premise ∃xψ(x) to justify the line "Declare v: ψ(v)", and then reproducing the derivation of a contradiction in (D n+1 , A n+1 ) . Thus, since (D n , A n ) is consistent, (D n+1 , A n+1 ) is too. In all other cases, we let (D n+1 , A n+1 ) = (D n , A n ). Finally, we let D = n∈N D n and A = n∈N A n . It is easy to verify that (D , A ) has the required properties.
Define an equivalence relation on D by saying that two variables v and w in D are equivalent if the equation v = w is an element of A . It is now straightforward to define a model of (D , A ) by using the set of equivalence classes of elements of D as the universe of the model and using elements of A to determine the interpretations of the nonlogical symbols in the model. But then this is a model of the original context (D, A) in which ϕ is false, contrary to the hypothesis of the theorem. Note that D may be the empty set, in which case the model constructed will have an empty universe. 15 Thus, we have found that the use of variable declarations in natural deduction leads to a formal system that is sound and complete, is easy to understand and use, corresponds closely to ordinary informal deductive reasoning, and 15 It is interesting to note that the relationship of potential dependency among the variables in an informal mathematical proof, which was the motivation for my quantifier rules, is not as rich as the relationship of dependency. For example, it is possible in an informal proof to declare that x and y stand for arbitrary objects and then define variables u and v so that u depends on x but not y, and v depends on y but not x. However, it is impossible, at a point in a proof where declarations of x and y as arbitrary are both in force, to have variables u and v defined in such a way that u potentially depends on x but not y, and v potentially depends on y but not x. The reason is simply that no order of introduction of the variables would produce such a combination of potential dependencies. The completeness theorem for my formal system shows that this limitation on the relationship of potential dependency does not prevent quantifier rules based on this relationship from justifying all correct first-order inferences. The reason, intuitively, is that the dependency relationships among variables in first-order formulas are similarly limited, because the quantifiers are linearly ordered. However, there are extensions of first-order logic in which more complex relationships among variables can occur. For example, the branching quantifier formula ∀x∃u ∀y∃v ϕ(x, y, u, v) defined in [9] leads to the dependency relationship among x, y, u, and v described earlier.
encourages good reasoning practices. And the investigation of this formal system has led to a number of unexpected bonuses. We have been able to eliminate the artificial ban on structures with empty universe that is required by many formal systems, and we have come to a better understanding of the semantics of the existential instantiation rule and of the use of imperative sentences in informal proofs.
